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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY M. HORMAN and 
THEODORE HORMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH and GALAXY 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants mul Respondents. 
Case No. 
10933 
Brief of Intervenor-Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Intervenor accepts the statement of facts as set 
forth by appellants except as to appellants' characteri-
zation of the decision of this court in Bird & Jex Co. v. 
Funk ( 1939) 96 Ut. 450, 85 P .2d 831, and the conclu-
sion that the decision in that case is dispositive of the 
question in the instant case. 
I 
Intervenor is a Nevada corporation authorized to 
do business in the State of Utah and is engaged in the 
business of outdoor advertising. In reliance on the 
Liquor Control Commission's regulation #4, intervenor 
entered into agreements and contracts to advertise light 
beer on its billboards throughout the State of Utah. 
A revocation of this order would deprive intervenor 
and all other outdoor advertisers doing business in 
Utah of a valuable source of revenue. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
There is no question that the summary judgment 
procedure was the proper vehicle for disposition of this 
case by the lower court. There was no genuine issue as 
to any material fact. The Utah Liquor Control Com-
mission had amended its regulations to permit, under 
certain strict conditions, the advertising of light beer 
on outdoor advertising structures. The question 
whether by so doing the Commission had exceeded its 
statutory authority is clearly one of law. Either the 
Liquor Control Act, Sections 32-1-1to32-)-43, U.C.A., 
1953, gives the Commission that authority or it doesn't. 
Since both the plaintiffs and the defendants moved for 
summary judgment, one of the movants was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law as provided by Rule 
56 ( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Tbe 
regulations are not challenged as being indefinite or 
ambiguous or upon any similar ground. The sole ques-
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tion is whether the state agency has the authority to 
promulgate them. 
It is intervenor's position that the Utah Liquor 
Control Commission had the authority to amend its 
rules and regulations and promulgate those in question 
and that, therefore, the ruling of the lower court was 
proper and should be affirmed. 
POINT I 
THE STATE LIQUOR COMMISSION HAS 
THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE REG-
ULATIONS ALLOWING THE ADVERTIS-
ING OF LIGHT BEER ON BILLBOARDS. 
Plaintiffs allege that the Liquor Commission has 
acted outside of the statutory delegation of power from 
the legislature in (I) repealing certain regulations 
which prohibited the billboard advertising of alcoholic 
beverages or (2) adopting regulations specially de-
signed to authorize such advertising upon clearly de-
fined conditions. 
Section 32-1-7, U.C.A., 1953, defines the Liquor 
Commission's power to make regulations as follows: 
"The Commission may, from time to time, 
make such resolutions, orders and regulations, 
not inconsistent with this act, as it may deem 
necessary for carrying out the provisions thereof 
and for its efficient administration ... The Com-
mission may amend or repeal such regulations 
... " (Emphasis added). 
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It is thus clear that the Commission has the power 
to amend or repeal any regulations promulgated under 
the act. The only remaining question then is whether 
the regulations in question are "inconsistent with this 
act". 
Section 32-7-27, U.C.A., provides: 
"The prohibition against advertising alcoholic 
beverages and against window displays in liquor 
stores of the Commission shall apply in like 
manner to all manufacturers and licensees of 
alcoholic beverages, and to package agencies. 
This provision shall be construed to prohibit the 
use of any electric or illuminated signs, contriv-
ance or device, signboard, billboard, or other dis-
play signs, and to prohibit the display of alco-
holic beverages or price lists in windows or show 
cases visible to passersby, and to prohibit the 
use of any other means of inducing persons to 
buy alcoholic beverages, or to enter places where 
alcoholic beverages are sold ; provided, that a 
simple designation of the fact that beer, wine, 
or other liquors are manufactured or sold under 
authority derived from the Commission may be 
placed in or upon the window or front of the 
place of business having such authority; and 
provided, further, that advertising of light beer 
shall be permitted under such regulation aJ the 
Commission may make." (Emphasis added). 
The definition section of the liquor control act, 
insofar as pertinent, is as follows: 
"The following words and phrases used in this 
act shall have the following meaning, unless a 
different meaning clearly appears from the con-
text: 
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"Alcoholic beverage" means and includes 
"beer" and "liquor" as they are defined herein 
" 
Eliminating excess verbage, the effect of Section 
32-7-27, U.C.A., as applied to the problem at hand 
is to prohibit outdoor advertising of alcoholic beverages 
except the outdoor advertising of light beer under regu-
lations promulgated by the Commission. If the Com-
mission has no authority to issue regulations authorizing 
the advertising of light beer, the last proviso of the 
section would have no meaning whatsoever. It would 
be incongruous to interpret the section to mean that 
the legislature intended to provide an exception for 
advertising of light beer under regulations issued by 
the Commission if the Commission did not have any 
authority to issue any regulation to make the proviso 
effective. 
Justice Wolfe pointed out in his dissent in Bird 
& Jex v. Fwnk, supra at p. 837, concerning the same 
proviso at issue before this court, that the proviso was 
tacked on to the draft of the bill that was sent to the 
legislature. It is not conceivable that the legislature 
would tack on a proviso to a bill that they knew or 
had reason to believe would not be of any effect. It is 
far more logical to believe that the legislature saw a 
need for amplification or clarification of the original 
version of the bill and a necessity for making a specific 
exception to the general prohibition contained in the 
original text. 
The general rule for the interpretation of statutes 
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is, of course, to ascertain, and if possible to give effect 
to the intention or purpose of the legislature as ex-
pressed in the statute, 82 C.J.S. 560. The intention of 
the Utah legislature in passing the instant provision 
of the Liquor Control Act is clear. By tacking on the 
words "and provided, further, that advertising of light 
beer shall be permitted under such regulation as the 
Commission may make" the legislature effectively ex-
pressed its intention to depart from the regular defi-
nition of alcoholic beverages and provide that for this 
purpose, namely that of advertising light beer, the 
broader prohibition preceding the proviso was not to 
be applicable. 
A second and corollary principle of statutory con· 
struction is that of utilizing the rule of ejusdem generis 
where necessary to give a provision a meaning con· 
sistent with the legislative intent. 
In Stone v. Salt Lake City (1960) 11 Ut. 2d 196, 
356 P.2d 631 and Hatch Co. v. Public Service Com· 
mission (1954) 3 Ut. 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809, this court held 
that specific terms used in a statute provide the limits 
for interpreting the general term. Thus, the legislative 
intent of the second provision, 32-7-27, becomes crystal 
clear. This proviso was a cutting out, separation or 
exclusion of light beer from the earlier prohibitions 
applicable to alcoholic beverages as a broader category. 
If this proviso is to be given any meaning at all, it must 
be considered as a specific exception to the general pro· 
sicriptions applied to alcoholic bever~ges as distin· 
guished from non-alcoholic beverages. 
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POINT II 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECI-
SION IN BIRD & JEX V. FUNK IS NOT DIS-
POSITIVE OF THIS CASE. 
The appellants assert that Bird & Jex v. Funk is 
controlling for the proposition that the statute pro-
hibits the outdoor advertising of light beer. They quote 
from the decision what they characterize as the holding 
of this court in that case: 
"Holding as we do that billboard and other 
outdoor display advertising is prohibited by the 
act, the appellants are in no position to question 
the validity of the other regulations adopted by 
the Commission, and for that reason we ref rain 
from passing on them." 85 P.2d 837 (Empha-
sis added). 
A careful analysis of the decision, however, will 
show that the underscored language did not represent 
the holding of the case. The court, carefully and speci-
fically, described the limits of this decision with the 
following language: 
"The question whether or not the powers 
granted to the Liquor Commission are consti-
tutional is not in dispute here, although appel-
lants intimate that if the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Liquor Commission are de-
termined by this court to be within the powers 
granted by the legislature to the Commission 
then such delegation of powers must of neces-
sity be unconstitutional. The only question to 
be determined at the moment is . . . does the 
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Liqiwr Control Commission have the power to 
prohibit the billboard advertising in the face of 
the last proviso in (32-7-27, U.C.A., 1953)." 
(Emphasis added). 
This court decided, therefore, only that the Com- , 
mission had such authority. This is the sole proposition 
for which Bird & Jex can be cited. The proposition that ' 
the Commission has no authority to promulgate regu-
lations authorizing billboard advertising of light beer 
does not follow from the proposition that the Commis-
sion has authority to issue regulations prohibiting the 
advertising of beer. To assert that the case also inter-
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preted the Utah statutes as prohibiting the advertising 
of light beer is to go beyond the scope of the decision. 
The argument gives dicta the stature of law. 
Dicta has been defined in 21 Corpus Juris Secun-
dum p. 310: "to include a statement or holding in an 
opinion not responsive to any issue and not necessary 
to the decision of the case". While it is true that the 
language used in the decison would seem on first blush 
to support appellants' position, careful analysis of the 
opinion as a whole demonstrates that the language 
relied upon by the appellants is inconsistent with the 
question specifically delineated and decided by the 
court. Since the proposition stated in the language 
relied upon by appellants was unnecessary for the reso-
lution of this question, it must be characterized as dicta. 
If the language relied upon by appellants in 
Bird & Jex is dicta, the lower court was not in any way 
obligated to follow it. While it is true that the rule 
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of stare decisis requires all inferior courts of the state 
to follow the decisions of their highest court, it is equally 
true that this applies only to the actual questions pre-
sented, discussed and decided. The statement of a 
principle not necessary to the decision will not be 
regarded either as a part of the decision or as a prece-
dent necessary to the rule of stare decisis. Childers v. 
Childers ( 1946) 7 4 Cal. A pp. 2d 56, 168 P .2d 218. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court acted reasonably and correctly in 
denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and 
in granting the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. Bird & Jex clearly is not dispositive upon the 
question now before this court. The Utah State Liquor 
Control Commission has the authority to promulgate 
regulations permitting the outdoor advertising of light 
beer. It is submitted that the action of the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
September II, 1967 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN and 
GORDON C. COFFMAN 
l 020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Galaxy Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. 
Intervenor-Respondent 
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